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THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMON LAW
GEORGE BURTON ADAmS
The leap forward which was taken in the development of the law and
of the judicial system in England from the reign of Henry I to the end
of Henry i's is to us surprising in every respect and in some alniost
incredible. From the death of Henry I to the writing of the book which
we call Glanvill was almost exactly half a century. Of what was going
on in the way of judicial change in the second half of this period, from
ni6o to 1185, we have many and instructive glimpses. Of the first
half, the period of Stephen's reign and of Henry's bringing England
into order, we know practically nothing and yet the impression that
we get is strong that the growth which begins to be evident soon after
i16o starts considerably in advance of the point which had been
reached in 1135.
The stage of development in law and judicial institutions reached
by the changes under Henry II is made abundantly clear to us in the
remarkable and enlightening book of Glanvill. There is nothing which
sums up in the same way the progress under Henry I. To find out
what was done in his time we are shut up to a study of the rather"
scanty remainder of material .from his reign, and to understand the
relation of the facts this material gives us to the general evolution of"
which it probably is a part, we must study it in the light of the results
attained in the last half of the century. Does it show that whatever
movement we can detect was going on in a direction naturally lead-
ing to the results which occurred? To answer this question we have
first a body of legal literature exceptional in amount for so early a
date; second, a body of institutional material in writs and charters,
smaller than we could desire, but greatly increased over the preceding
period; and third, a single financial document from the end of the
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reign, the pipe roll of 1130, especially valuable from the close con-
nection existing then between judicial and financial administration.
In beginning our study it is necessary first of all to recall the fact,
indicated by a study of the earlier period, that the. changes in the
judicial system which form the great constitutional advance of Henry
II's reign were the natural and gradual culmination of a series of
changes which began with the Norman Conquest. As has been before
shown, the first instance of the use of the new judicial processes out
of which Henry's reforms grew falls within half a dozen years of the
battle of Hastings.1 From lO72 on they never dropped out of use
and, although we can trace them only at intervals, it is already to be
seen in the evidence which we do have that their use was increasing
and that they were growing more and more into a judicial system.
Indefinite they certainly were and unfixed as yet, but still a complete
judicial system was taking shape over against the older system of the
popular courts as an alternative which might be used in many cases.
A study of the writs of Henry I's reign, of which there is a great
number, not as yet critically edited or dated, but brought together
in Bigelow's Placita Anglo-Normannica of 1881, with many later addi-
tions now possible,2 will show clearly both that they are a natural out-
growth of what was begun by William I and also that the develop-
ment was already under way which was to result in the advance made
by Henry II. If further we consider the development which goes on
in Norn'andy under the father of Henry 11,3 as we must, as an epoch
in the growth of English institutions, then it becomes manifest how
natural is the continuation of that growth under Henry II, and how
broad a foundation had been laid in the past for his work.
Looking forward instead of backward, we are compelled to say that
there is scarcely to be found in history a group of changes which
make so little innovation upon what had gone before, and yet
were followed by so wide reaching and profound results. This is true
whether we consider them as individual institutions or in their united
constitutional effects. Not "merely do our judicial institutions and pro-
cesses, writ and jury, the judge and his relation to the trial, the system
of courts, and equity and the common law, come directly from these
changes, but it was as a reaction against the strict centralization which
they produced in the constitution, the transformation of the practical
absolutism of the Normans into a constitutional absolutism, when that
'See Adams, The Local King's Court in the Reign of William I (94) 23
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These may be noted from William Farrer's An Outline Itinerary of King
Henry the First (1919) 34 ENG. HIsT. REv. 303-382, .05-579; also published
separately. This itinerary serves admirably as a general index to the documen-
tary material of Henry's reign, with more careful dating than before, but hardly
takes the place of critical regesta.
' See Haskins, Norman Institutions (1918) 123-155.
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came to be expressed in the sort of depotism to which the character
of John gave rise, that the Great Charter was demanded and the
foundation of free constitutional government was laid down.4
When we study these changes as they occurred under Henry II, we
are studying law, but we understand only half their significance if we
regard merely their judicial and legal results. I imagine it is possible
to have our free constitution without our judicial system or our com-
mon law, but without the incidental results of the processes by which
they were brought into existence under Henry II and extended in prin-
ciple to administration under Richard I, it is doubtful if we should
have had, it is difficult at least to see how we could have had, our
present constitutional government as it was historically formed.
Whether so much as this is true or not, it is at least true that, though
we are studying in Henry's time judicial and legal institutions, we are
really studying the history of our constitution in one of the most
important periods of its growth.
The expansion of earlier practices in the reign of Henry to which we
may attribute these results concerns not so much the actual content
of the law, regulating conduct and business, substantive law, as it does
the administration and enforcement of the law through the judicial
system and processes. They were primarily and in their character
institutional rather than legal changes and were accomplished through
new regulations in regard to the writs, the jury and the system of
courts. Combined together and regarding strictly the institutional and
not the constitutional results, they gave rise to the English common
law, which also took up into itself a body of pre-existing substantive
law which had not been affected by these changes. Regarded from
this point of view, as giving rise to the common law, these institutional
- changes established three things which may be stated in this way:
first, new courts of more extensive and summary powers; second a
new method of getting the defendant or the accused before the court;
"It must be understood that to deny a reactiohary character to ch. 39 of
Magna Carta, as is now often done, is not to deny the reactionary character of
the whole movement of which Magna Carta is a result. The enduring centraliz-
ing effects of the Carolingian constitution, from which these institutions came,
and especially of the minsi, the Anglo-Norman itinerant justices, are admirably
described by Brunner: "S.chfrfer als jede andere Einrichtung kennzeichnet das
missatische Institut den Geist der karolingischen Verfassung. Als des K6nigs
unmittelbare Stellvertreter brachten die Missi in Staat und Kirche die Reform-
gedanken des K6nigtums zur Geltung und machten sie eine Centralisation der
Verwaltung miglich, wie sie kein germanischer Staat des Mittelalters aufzu-weisen hat, mit Ausnahme der normannischen Staatsbildung, die auf fr~nkischer
Grundlage erwuchsen. Die lange daurende Nachwirkung, welche die frinkische
Rechtsentwicklung nach Auflasung der Monarchie in den daraus hervorgegan-
genen Reichen hinterliess, beruht zum guten Teile auf dem tiefgreifenden
Einflusse, den der frinkische K6nig durch seine Missi auf die Provinzialverwal-
tung ausiibte." 2 Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (1892) 195.
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and third, a new method of proof. In other words these are again:
the itinerant justice and common pleas courts, the writs, and the jury
in their later forms, including the assizes, and these were only extended
applications of the courts of the king's commissioner or Missus, the
writs, the jury and the recognitions of William I's time.5
Plainly these changes concerned procedure and, putting them
together, it can readily be seen that they furnished a nearly complete
substitute for the old judicial system in which procedure was as
strongly emphasized as in the new. But it is equally clear that they
furnished no substitute for the old substantive law and scarcely any
addition to it, At the end of the reign of Henry II it was possible to
try a case to judgment and execution with hardly any use of the old
procedure ;6 but it was not possible to try it without constant recourse
to the old substantive law as defining and determining rights and obli-
gations. Upon such subjects as the holding, transfer, renting and
inheritance of land, the property, inheritance and dower rights of
women, debts, contracts and distraint, personal status, the obligations
of the warrantor, the right of advowson, and many such topics of
substantive law, the new law had nothing to say. It might be true
that there was here and there during the period some modification of
the law of these things, made generally by special enactment,7 but such
modifications were by the way, of minor importance, and they were
not necessary parts of the new whole. That provided new courts and
new remedies but not new definitions of right
It is clear then that the new common law considered as a whole comes
from two different sources; its substantive law from one source and
its adjective law from another. Its adjective law as made a part of
' See supra note I.
It should be said by way of qualification that the old method of making judg-
ment by the decision of the body of suitors who formed the court had not
changed. See Adams, Procedure in the Feudal Curia Regis (1913) 13 Co. L.
REv. 277, 293. In BRAcroN's NoT BooK (1887) pl. 67, of the year 1219, in the
case before the itinerant justices it is plainly the county which makes the judg-
ment. The justices are fined, not because they made the judgment, but because
they did not instruct the county that the evidence was insufficient and the verdict
of the jury incomplete. The division of functions is clear. The justices declare
the law; the assembly makes the judgment. The Carolingian missus asks the
assembly or the scabini to form the judgment. Brunner, Forschungen (1894)
2v; see infra note 14.
" See some of the instances enumerated infra note 29.
'It is desirable to hold in mind the fact that for a long time the new system
was only an alternative one. No one was in any way obliged to make use of it
who did not wish to do so. Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution
(1Q2o) 146. The old courts and the old processes still remained open and were
indeed in constant use during most of the thirteenth century and in occasional
use still later. In the king's council, great and small, the head and summit of
the popular courts, the new procedure did not establish itself, and their repre-
sentatives to-day, the House of Lords and the Privy Council, in important partic-
ulars still use the old.
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the national judicial system was new; its substantive law as defining
rights and obligations was old, that is, it was old as compared with
the new judicial system which could now be used to enforce it. It
belonged in the time of the old judicial system of the popular courts
which was now beginning to be pushed out of use. But it was not
itself pushed out of use with the old system to which it originally
belonged. Taken up by the new system, it formed nearly the whole
of the body of substantive law which was enforced by the courts, at
least until the first great legislative age of English history, which was
opened by the statute of Marlborough in 1267.
By general consent Glanvill's Tractatus de Legibus et Consuetudini-
bus Angliae, written probably between 1185 and 1 19o, is regarded as the
first in the series of great books on the English common law. There
was, however, an earlier period which may be considered roughly
the first quarter of the twelfth century when there was a remarkable
activity in writing books about English law. In that time or only
slightly outside its limits, seven books were composed, or collections
put together, purporting to give contemporary law. They were, as now
entitled: Hic intimatur; Leis Willelme; Quadripartitus; Leges Hen-
rici; Instituta Cnuti; Consiliatio Cnuti; and Leges Edwardi Con-
fessoris.9
The general presumption which these books create is that they x'vere
designed to give the contemporary law actually in force; or that it was
thought they would be useful books for those who for any reason
needed to know what the law was by which the courts of the time
were guided. In one of them, the Leges Henrici, this intention is so
plainly implied as to be more than a presumption."' When we come
to examine them in detail, however, we find that without exception
what they record is either Anglo-Saxon law or law purporting to be
made or accepted by William I. At the date when they were written,
especially at the date when the longest and most instructive of them,
the Leges Henrici and the Leges Edwardi Confessoris, were written,
there had been a very considerable:development of the new prerogative
justice. The writ as a judicial process was in frequent use and was
beginning to show signs of growth upon its formal side;" inquisition
by a jury to establish facts in litigation, was not uncommon; iters by
royal justices to hold the new courts in the counties were probably
not yet made the regular rule but they were common enough to show
that such a step was near ;12 and royal commissioners to hold local
'I Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsachsen (19o3) 486-619, 627-671.
" Cf. Leges Henrici, c. 8, 7; I Liebermann, op. cit. 554, and Liebermann, Ueber
Leges Henrici (igoi) 44, notes 5-9.
"See infra, note 21.
"Bishop Stubbs's argument, Lectures on Early English History (19o6) x54,
155, based upon Leges Henrici, 10, 4 and ig, i (I Liebermann, Gisetze der
Angelsachsen-, 556, 559) for the activities of the itinerant justices under Henry I,
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king's courts were frequently appointed. 13  The new justice was far
from being a fixed part of the constitutional system, far from
being a substitute for the older judicial organization, but it seems
to us as if it were already so prevalent on every side of legal adminis-
tration that it could not escape the notice and remark of any contem-
porary interested in practical legal matters, especially not of a king's jus-
tice. When we add that all the writers of Henry I's time show them-
selves to be more interested in adjective than in substantive law, the
fact that in them all there is scarcely a reference to the new prerogative
justice in any of its particulars becomes significant.1
4
It becomes exceedingly significant when we consider the case of the
Leges Henrici. If there is among these writers any one who could
contest with Glanvill the honor of opening the series of great writers
on the English common law, it is the author of the Leges Henrici. His
must be given up, since these clauses are dealing not with jurisdiction but with
revenue. 3 Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsachsen, 318. They do not mean that
the king's pleas shall not be heard by the sheriffs ex officio, but that the proceeds
of these pleas are not to be reckoned in the sheriff's farm unless there has been
a special agreement that they shall be. The king's pleas were at this time unques-
tionably heard by the sheriffs ex officio. They go back, though not the whole
list of them, into a time when there were no itinerant justices and no royal
commissioners hearing pleas of any kind and they would naturally pass with
other functions of the sheriff into the Norman period. For the approach to
regularity of the iters of the justices, compare the entries concerning them in
the pipe roll of 1130 with similar entries in the pipe rolls of Henry II, 116o
to 1170.
See an interesting chronicle account of one of these courts, of the last part
of the reign of Stephen, strikingly like those of the time of William I (supra
note i), published by Miss Helen M. Cam in (1924) 39 ENG. HIsT. REv. 568-571.
",There are unconnected references in the Leges Henrici to single features of
the new procedure. Summons by writ is barely mentioned, 41, 6. The justice
summons to his county court and whoever so summoned does not attend is
guilty of contempt of the king, 53, I; cf. 42, 2; 52, i. The king's justice is
referred to often, sometimes the specially appointed, probably itinerant, justice,
66, 9, more often doubtless the sheriff commissioned as justice, but only two
passages are of real significance. In 31, 2 we are told that when opinion is
divided among those who make the judgment (judices, the assembly or the
committee standing for the assembly, 29, ib) "the opinion of the better shall
prevail, that which seems more satisfactory to the justice," clearly even if it is
that of minority-a very welcome indication of the function of the royal justice
before he acquires the power of making the judgment. Certainly in case the
opinion is that of a minority, it must be the decision of the justice that a judg-
ment has been reached. In a certain case of doubtful evidence, a jury is to be
chosen from the better men, chosen probably by a king's justice, since the jury
is still a royal process only, and apparently by virtue of his general commission
without a special writ, 42, 2a. This is the only reference to the jury in the book.
The reference to the use of juries by William I to compile the old laws of
England in the unhistorical introduction to the Leges Edwardi Confessoris is
evidence that the writer was familiar with such a use to which the jury might
be put, but is hardly evidence of that use of the jury in judicial procedure in
which we are here interested.
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book with all its limitations is a most interesting one. It is of about the
same length as Glanvill; it fits into the same general framework of
things; it deals with many of the same topics; it has, like that book,
much feudal law and much non-feudal mingled together; it is by a jus-
tice of the curia regis and emphasizes the superiority of the king's law;
it deals at length with the boundary line between private jurisdiction
and the royal jurisdiction; and it occupies in regard to all these topics
much the same point of view as Glanvill. The book also clearly
reveals the high ambitions of its author. He had read some books of
canon law and had been interested in the discussion he found in them
of the ultimate principles of jurisprudence. He had reflected upon
the English law which he had administered as a king's justice.15 He
had a dim conception of the philosophy of law, and the ideal which he
held up before himself was a scientific treatise on the English law in
which he should show its relation to the fundamental principles of
jurisprudence and as a practical matter should classify its actions. He
hoped to accomplish something like what Bracton attempted nearly a
century and a half later under happier auspices. But the task was
too great for him and the fault was not entirely his. The undeveloped
and transitional character of the law of his day, the lack of unity in it
as a whole, the contradictions in it as he found it even in details,
though he may not have been quite conscious of these defects, affected
the training to be derived from its study and inevitably limited the
possibilities of the mind which derived its material from reflection upon
it. It was too difficult a task to bring into scientific order a body of
law which was an inharmonious mixture of two or three different
legal systems and, as it was written down at least, of more than one
stage in the development of the same system.16
When we compare these books with Glanvill's Treatise these charac-
teristics of the best of the writings of Henry I's time stand out still
more clearly. Two inferences are especially important for our present
purpose. One is that in the earlier period the new prerogative jus,
tice had not yet reached a point where it gave any indication of what
its future was to be or even impressed itself as a matter of interest
15 Liebermann, Ueber Leges Henrici, supra, 44-45.
"The payments in kind for various ranks under the name of "relief," specifi-
cally provided for in Leges Henrici c. 14, belong to a stage in the development
of feudalism far in the past of the Norman feudalism of the writer's own time,
which he faithfully depicts elsewhere. William I's writ for the collection of
relief in the bishopric of Worcester, of l095 (Round, FJeudal England (1895) 3o8-
311, cf. Hubert Hall, Eng. Hist. Doc. (io8) (269, note i) shows the practice of
money payments well established. This writ was printed by Bigelow, op. cit.
supra, xliii, with comment on it in relation to the relief and to Flambard's system.
The payment of relief in horses and arms, as recorded in the Leges Henrici and
Cnut, from whom the passage is mainly borrowed, is quite consistent with a
feudalism which had developed out of the comitatus side only of feudal origins,
but not with Norman feudalism.
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upon students of the law who were engaged in its practical enforce-
ment and deeply interested in procedure. The men most likely to
understand what these innovations would mean and to describe them
in the books they were writing gave no indication that they were con-
scious of their existence. The other inference is that in the half cen-
tury or a little more before the writing of Glanvill's book the advance
in the development of these institutions must have been exceedingly
rapid. The new justice was as entirely the only justice for Glanvill
as the old was for the author of the Leges Henrici or of the Leges
Edwardi Confessoris. Further, the law which Glanvill writes is no
longer an inharmonious mixture thrown together unblended, from
different sources and different stages of the history of the same source.
Glanvill's law, while it can be analyzed to show clearly enough the
different sources from which it comes, impresses us as -, e read it as a
wholly consistent and homogeneous body of law grown into one
organic whole as if from the hand of a single legislator.17 These two
things have happened in the half century: the new justice has become
the ruling judicial system of the kingdom and the law which it
enforces has been fused into a whole, unified and self-consistent.
When we come to raise the question whether we can determine
exactly how these two results were accomplished in that half century
before Glanvill, that book is again our guide to the answer. First as
a matter of historical explanation it cannot be too strongly emphasized
that the book, if it was written by Glanvill, reveals clearly the fact that
a king's justice, a chief justiciar of the kingdom even, in the last
quarter of the twelfth century was mainly interested in procedure.
The book is first and foremost a book of procedure. Whoever wrote
it, the essential fact is the same, for beyond doubt it was written, if
not by Glanvill himself, at least with his sanction and probably with his
guidance and advice. The inference from these facts is, I think, not
to be questioned. Procedure was the one chief interest, and it attracted
chief interest to itself because it was the impelling and formative influ-
ence which had made the book possible. The book which records the
result of the great transformation of the prece-ding generation in the
supremacy of the new justice shows unmistakably that the transforma-
tion which had been wrought was a transformation of procedure. The
7 The book was from the hand of a writer to whom the law was not a mass of
detached fragments still bearing the marks of their distinct origins, nor framed
of separate pieces still showing joints however cunningly carpentered together,
as it was in general to th% writer of the Leges Henrici, but from one who has
come to feel the law as a consistent unity with no consciousness of the sources
from which it has come. It is interesting to note that in this characteristic of
organic combination into a unified whole the first part of the" Norman Tr~s
Ancien Couturnier (Tardif, Coutuiniers de Normandie [1903]) which is a little
later in date than Glanvill, and the Lombard Libri Feudorumo (Lehmann, Das
Langobardische Lehnrecht [1896]) of the next century plainly reveal the patching
together of material of various origins not yet merged into a common unity.
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new justice was new on its procedural side. Almost the whole of its
substantive law was old.
If now we analyze Glanvill in search of an especially impelling and
creative element of procedure, it becomes instantly apparent that what
claims the writer's first and constant interest is the writ. The book
is primarily a book of writs. The active agent in it is the writ.
Whatever departure from the old system of justice is to be made,
whatever innovation is to be introduced, or has been in the past,
whatever thing of any kind is to be done, the writ is the instrument
by which it is accomplished.18  Further Glanvill implies that this pro-
cess of change by which the system he describes has been built up
may go on indefinitely by means of new writs which are easy of for-
mation.'9 Glanvill leaves no doubt that it was the writ which was
the compelling force by which the new justice was made the ruling
judicial system at the end of the twelfth century. How that was done,
it is not necessary to show here by the history of specific writs like the
writ of right or the writ praecipe. Their operation in extending the
jurisdiction of the prerogative courts is well enough known.' What
I wish to do rather is to emphasize the fact that in transforming the
judicial system of the kingdom from the Saxon system of nationally
unorganized popular courts into the closely organized and even cen-
tralized system of later times the active agent which was used to bring
the change about was the writ.
Originally the writ was any written command of the king addressed
to any one, official or non-official, directing him to do any kind of thing.
There is no evidence that at first fixed forms were used in the composi-
tion of the writ. Each new one was written to fit the occasion, seem-
ingly as if no one had ever been drawn up before.2' No classification of
" See I Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (1895) 130; Adams,
Origin of the English Constitution (192o) iii, and note 4.
a' Glanvill, II, 13; XII, 3; XIII, 34.
I have endeavored in The Origin of the English Constitution, supra, to make
the operation and effect of these writs clear to one who reads without technical
knowledge.
'Reference here is not to the diplomatic forms which distinguish the writ
from the charter. These are fairly well fixed in the time of William I, though
there is in them also no fixity of language. The command which follows the
greeting is given in a considerable variety of words, and precipio has as yet
gained no lead over volo and mando. The reference is to the formulae which
later denote the purpose of the writ like those of the writ of right or of novel
disseisin. The formula so frequent in later writs of right, "ne amplius clamorem
audiam pro defectu justicie," occurs in briefer form in one writ of William rs
(Davis, Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum (1913) App'x, no. XXIX). In
this occurrence it is probably a Frankish reminiscence and is hardly used like a
formula with a specific intention. See an example of a writ of right of Stephen's
in informal, almost conversation, shape. 2 GtOUcsnR CARTULARY (1865) 96-97.
See Maitland, Forms of Action (199o) 315.
A good instance of the development of the writ, indicating and no doubt fol-
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the early writs is possible. If we say that a given writ of William I's is
the ancestor of a class of later writs, we do so because the business
it initiates belongs to that class of writs, not because the formula
peculiar to the class is used. Though in the phrases used some later
formulae are foreshadowed, yet they were not used as formulae at that
time. There had not yet been experience enough in their use to sug-
gest that the writ should be made more specific in form and that perma-
nence of form would be a convenience. In the next reign phrases begin
to be repeated in the way of formulae, but it is the reign of Henry I
that is the period of real progress in fixing the form of writs and so
of preparing the way for an arrangement into classes.
The development of writ forms and writ classification is slow, but
from the very beginning the compelling and directing force which is
behind the writ is evident. It is the royal authority, the king's abso-
lute power. The writ is the one formal instrument which, in advance
of the formation of the constitutional absolutism which was to result
from its use, was employed by the king as the instrument of his
authority. It was a serious matter to disobey the king's formal man-
date. "Contemptus brevium" was a king's plea, added to the Saxon
pleas, after the analogy of the "dispectus litterarum regis" of the
Frankish law and putting the offender "in misericordia regis. ' 22  In
the writ praecipe, which was the weapon of the most formidable
attack of the twelfth century upon the independence of the baronial
jurisdiction, the legal justification for setting the baron's court aside
was found in the obligation of every man to obey the king's command.
If the defendant does not do justice as directed, the sheriff is com-
lowing an increasing clearness of purpose, is that of the writ of novel disseisin.
Compare (i) LXVI and LXVII of Davis's Regesta, App'x, (Round in (1924)
29 ENG. HIsT. REv. 349), which show, so far as language goes, prerogative reseisin
after recent disseisin with no provision for a trial (See Davis, App'x, LXIII
and I Cartularium de Rameseia (1884) no. 157). (2) A writ of Henry I, i GLoU-
cEST R CARTULARY, no. 2o2 (Bigelow, op. cit. supra, 128), which shows a distinct
advance in form and does provide for a trial. (3) A writ of Stephen's printed
by Round, Commune of London (1899) 114, note 3, less satisfactory in form but
providing for a trial, and another, ibid. 114, less advanced. (4) Two Abingdon
writs of early Henry II, 2 ABiNGDON CHRONICLE (1858) 222, 223 (Bigelow,
op. cit. 169, 170) which show some advance especially in clearness. Bigelow says,
at 173, that this is the "first appearance of the perfect, or nearly perfect, writ
of novel disseisin."
To compare with these writs is an interesting judgment of a baronial court in
France of about X132, Langlois, Textes Relatifs a l'Histoire du Parlement (1888)
no. VII, p. 13, pronouncing a restoration of seisin, leaving the question of jus
to be settled by a later action, which seems also to be the implication in some
of the writs cited above. Of equal interest is a writ of Geoffrey de Mandeville
of Stephen's time directing in plain terms a recognition to be made of an alleged
disseisin. 3 Howlett, Chronicles of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard I (1886),
xxxvii, and see Howlett's text. This writ is also in Bigelow, op. cit., i6o, and
I Madox, Exchequer (769) io8, note k.
'Brunner, Schwurgerichte (1872) 77.
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manded to summon him to come before the king or his justices
"ostensurus quare non fecerit," to explain his disobedience. If it is
well known that he will not do the act of justice called for in the first
part of the writ and that, when he appears before the king's justices,
he will not in form explain his disobedience but answer in regular
pleadings in a civil suit, these things do not obscure the legal right
upon which the king's action rests. The writ, the instrument from the
beginning of the king's absolute prerogative, was the active agent by
which the whole structure of prerogative justice was built up into a
national system of justice, taking the place of the old system of the
Saxon popular courts.
But if the writ was agent and process, it had very substantial
materials with which to work in building up a new judicial system.
The court of the king's commissioner held in any locality of the king-
dom was a curia regis, that is, it was not subject to the defects and
limitations of the popular county court. The court which met the com-
missioner was the old ideal county court; all exemptions and liberties
which cut into the assembly of the sheriff's ordinary court were sus-
pended.23  The law which the court applied and enforced, while it
was the old local law,24 was that local law supplemented and possibly
overruled in some particulars by the superior and uniform king's law.
When the presiding justice was a commissioner specially sent for the
purpose, like the itinerant justice, he stood distinctly, sometimes in
early writs by explicit declaration in his commission, in the place of
the king and enjoyed extensive powers in issuing summary processes
and in guidance concerning the law.2 5  In the jury was provided a
method of proof by getting at the knowledge of the locality about the
exact facts at issue in place of the older methods of compurgation,
which at best merely got the opinion of the community concerning the
credibility of the parties, or of the ordeal as an appeal to heaven in
which even in the twelfth century men were beginning to lose faith.
=Very likely it was considered that as the new courts and processes were not
an outgrowth of the older judicial system but came from a wholly different
origin, arising from an exercise of the king's prerogative, nothing in an earlier
grant of liberty released from them. The suspension of the liberty was no viola-
tion of the grant. The suspension is indicated in Henry I's writ regarding the
local courts, Stubbs, Select Charters (1913) i22; in Leges Henrici, cc. 7, 2; 29;
31, 3; and in Assize of Clarendon, cc. 5, 8; 9; II; cf. Trs Ancien Coutuinier,
c. XLIV. Quite naturally in an age of special privileges the principle was not
maintained. New exemptions began at once to be granted which did relieve
from attendance on the new courts and from service on assizes and juries, and
continued to be freely granted during the century which followed Henry II.
See the Petition of the Barons, 1258, c. 28, for the effect of these exemptions on
the business of the county court. Stubbs, op. cit. 378.
"Glanvill, XII, 23.
See the powers assumed by the justice in the case of Bishop Gundulf against
Picot, Adams, op. cit. supra note 1, at p. 5o5, note 38, and on the duty of the
justice to instruct the court in the law, see supra note 6.
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The jury accounts for what popular support there was for the new
justice and explains the current which began to set out of the old
courts into the new, for in that more primitive period the man who
was confident that he had a good case was anxious to get a jury trial
if he could. So it is to be remenbered that the new judicial system
was not built up by the prerogative power alone, but that power rein-
forced by a better law, a better court, more summary processes, and a
superior method of proof.
But the importance of these facts in themselves and as historical
explanation should not lead us to forget that procedure is after all
only the practical method by which the law is applied and enforced.
It is not the real substance of the law. It is not substantive law.
The new procedure was the one great interest of the time, but the
growth of the new procedure into a national system made pos-
sible another transformation in the end of even deeper significance,
the bringing of Saxon and Norman substantive law together into a
unified national law, as they appear in Glanvill. To understand how
this was brought about we turn again to the adjective side of law.
It was in the prerogative courts that this process of unification was
accomplished.
For the ordinary sheriff's county court the normal law was the Saxon.
According to that law would be determined all cases naturally fall-
ing in that court. The feudal law, or the new Norman law, would
come into the county court probably not at all or rarely, and then
it would not be into the ordinary county court but into the court of
a king's commissioner using the machinery of the county court to hold
a local curia regis. 28 All the usual cases under feudal law, which would
include practically all cases relating to land, were provided for. in the
private courts of the lords or directly, if important enough or involv-
ing a question of title held from the king, in the great or small curia
regis as the king's court for the whole kingdom. In this way it is highly
probable that, without saying anything about it, the Norman conquest
made a division of jurisdiction from the beginning. The law regu-
lating the ownership of land ceased to be Saxon; it became feudal.27
All cases regarding it would fall naturally into the feudal courts, royal
or private, and, while not in any formal way withdrawn from the old
local courts, would appear there no more.2 Such a practical separa-
'As in a case arising between the vassals of two different lords, or one of
default of right on the part of the lord.
See, for a discussion of this question, Adams, op. cit. supra note i, at p. 503,
note 34.
'The baronial court is a local court, co5rdinate, for the cases. falling in it, with
the county court though not in the same system of jfistice. The court rolls of
the next century show that a good deal of litigation concerning land took place
in county courts, but they give no evidence that it came into them as courts of
first instance. Much the larger proportion of such cases plainly appears in these
courts through the operation of writs of right and there is a clear presumption
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tion of courts and of law we suspect from the peculiarities of the
Leges Henrici, and such a separation of jurisdiction and of law would
continue with no progress toward a unification of the two systems, so
long as each set of courts confined itself to its own business, and no
courts arose trying at once and on the same footing both kinds of
cases. It is the increasing frequency of the use of the court of the
king's commissioner or missus which brings about the union. Pri-
marily in the Norman state this was a feudal court for feudal cases and;
so far as we can now see, it was pressure from increasing business of
this feudal kind that forced the development forward, but this justice
court, as a King's court, was just as normally a national court for all
kinds of cases under any kind of law locally recognized. In the curia
regis, general or local, there was no ground on which a distinction of
jurisdiction, feudal or non-feudal, or of law, Saxon or Norman, could
be maintained. In the king's court, under the king's justice, the two
systems melt into one homogeneous whole for that court and, because
that court appears everywhere, for the whole kingdom. That is, it
becomes the common law.
There were united then in Glanvill streams from two sources of sub-
stantive law, Saxon and Norman, to form the greater stream of Eng-
lish common law which flows from this point on without an inter-
ruption. To these sources must be added a third whose contribution
was just beginning to be received, legislation,"o for although the early
that in all cases the county court is the king's, not the sheriff's. The writ of
right of course indicates an original baronial jurisdiction.
' Glanvill knows a considerable b6dy of legislation and is well aware of its
effect. In II, 7 is the well known passage in praise of the grand assize which
is stated in correct technical phrase to have been granted "de consilio procerum,"
as if the writer had a copy of the document before him, like the ordinance of
William I on the ecclesiastical courts, or was familiar with its language. In the
same ordinance apparently, the penalty of those jurors who swear falsely in the
assize "ordinata est." II, 19, i. To this assize had been added, at another time
it would seem, "quedam constitutio" to limit the number of possible essoins.
II, 12, 2. Still another question had arisen, evidently in the experience of the
writer with the assize, which could be, but had not been, settled. II, 21. "Statu
turn est etiam in regno domini Regis" that those clerks who had been presented
to churches by those who had usurped the right of advowson during time of
war should hold them during their lives. IV. IO. 2. By assize. "de consilio
regni inde factam," record in the king's courts had been granted to minor courts
in several specified cases. VIII, 8, 3. A "general assize" might have been made
to equalize through all the counties the amercement falling to the sheriff in a cer-
tain case. That is a statute would override the differences of the local laws.
But none has yet been made on the subject. IX, IO. The court Christian has
been forbidden to hear pleas of lay debts or tenements on the ground of faith
pledged. X. 12. I. The other forms of jury trial to which the name assize
became permanently attached, besides the grand assize, the three possessory
assizes, and the assize utrunt, are discussed in Book XIII and their legislative
character recognized, "ex beneficio constitutionis regni," but it is evident that the
distinction which was later made between them and the recognitions called for
by a new issue raised in the course of the pleadings, which were called jurata todistinguish them from the assizes, was not yet sharply made. Glanvill seems to
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statutes were in their practical effect in the courts like those of to-day
statutes and not common or customary law, that is they overruled all
other law, the important ones of this period all became in the process
of interpretation and application absorbed into and indistinguishable
parts of the thirteenth century common law. -In other words the new
body of law which appears thus formed in Glanvill was from its birth,
to change the figure, a living thing. It began at once to grow in the
two ways by which it has ever since continued to grow, by the power
of natural expansion from within through judgments rendered and
precedents established and by accretion from without by legislation.
By a date hardly more than a century after Glanvill its natural
growth had so changed the body of the law that both the great ele-
ments of which it had originally been composed, as they appeared in
Glanvill, had almost disappeared from sight. The Saxon had dis-
appeared more completely than the feudal or more accurately perhaps
survived in less conspicuous features of the law. But the feudal was
hardly less changed for, while it is true for example that the feudal is
clearly enough the foundation of our land law, it is also true that the
feudalism of the great land statutes of Edward I's reign would have
been thought in Glanvill's time a strange feudalism, a distinctly emas-
culated feudalism. Glanvill marks the beginning of the common law
upon its substantive side by the union of earlier elements and reveals
clearly the sources from which they came, but it was a living not a dead
law which he recorded, and the rapid life of the thirteenth century soon
left his book behind and his law in the form in which he wrote it. His
adjective law, which formed the other great side of the common law,
changed less from what he wrote, as is natural perhaps in matters of
form, and many of Glanvill's writs though divided and subdivided may
be recognized in common usage down to our own time.& If it were
possible for Glanvill to attend the session of a common pleas court in any
English-speaking country of the present day, except perhaps in those
few places where the Roman law prevails, he would see and hear much
that would make him feel at home.
class them all together in XIII, 2, and in XIII, 13, he calls one of them assria.
Perhaps it was still fresh in mind'in Glanvill's time that all uses of the jury had
been granted by a legislative act. XIII, ii, ii is an exception which must have
been made such in the legislation creating the assize, or added to it later, and
it would probably be later in date than the great rebellion of 1173-n74. XIII,
11, 12 states that the assize also will not lie in case of a burgage tenement "per
aliam assisam ex causa majoris utilitatis in regno constitutam." According to
XIII, 32 the time within which a disseisin must have taken place to come within
the assize had more than once been fixed "a domino rege de consilio procerum."
The use of the jury of accusation, as provided for in the Assize of Clarendon,
is not clearly referred to by Glanvill except in the passage concerning the punish-
ment of usurers, VII, I6, 3, and its legislative character is not mentioned, unless
it be indirectly referred to in XIV, 2. A reference should be added to XIV, 3, 2.
' Compare the medieval and the modern writs in IY Holdsworth History of
English Law (903) App'x.
